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The Mizan Newsletter aims at giving an objective and balanced account of current Soviet writings on the Middle East

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MIDDLE EAST

The Soviet Approach to Islam is an account of the basic preoccupation, and at the same time the basic weakness, of Soviet studies on Islam - their refusal to recognize Islam as a spiritual force in its own right. A feature of Soviet Islamic studies is their insistence on the political and class content of Islamic movements. At the same time, traditions of materialist philosophy in Muslim countries are now receiving increasing Soviet attention.

The Middle East in the Soviet Press reviews Soviet comment on the change of overnment in Persia, Soviet-Turkish relations, the assassination of the Jordanian Premier, Soviet-UAR relations and other topics. The messages exchanged between Khrushchev and the Turkish Premier on the subject of Soviet-Turkish relations are given in an appendix.

AFRICA

Zimbabwe is an account of a Soviet study on the origins of the great stone ruins of Zimbabwe and other sites in Southern Rhodesia. The Soviet writer claims to go further than "bourgeois" Africanists in attributing the Zimbabwe culture not to Bantu immigrants from the north but to Africans of basically indigenous stock.

A British delegate to the Orientalists' Congress in Moscow has contributed an article on the proceedings in the African section of the Congress.

The Congo in the Soviet Press is a survey of reports on the Congo events appearing in Soviet newspapers in the period 26th July - 21st September. For reasons of space, Soviet reports on developments elsewhere in Africa will be reviewed in the next issue of the Newsletter.

THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ISLAM

The attitude of Soviet Communists towards Islam exhibits two basic and frequently conflicting preoccupations. One is the desire for the good will and support of Muslims both inside and outside the USSR; the other is distrust of Islam as a force capable of mobilizing not only anti-Communist but also anti-Russian sentiment.

An initial concern of the Bolshevik revolutionaries on attaining power was to win the sympathy of the Muslim masses. An appeal to all Muslim working people of Russia and the East, issued by the Soviet revolutionary Government on 19th December 1917, declared:

> "Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and mountaineers of the Caucasus, and all whose mosques and places of worship have been destroyed, whose customs have been trampled underfoot by the Tsars and tyrants of Russia, your beliefs and customs, national and cultural institutions are free and inviolable. Organize your national life in all liberty. It is your right."

The appeal went on to assure "the Muslims of the Orient, Persians, Turks, Arabs, Indians and all whose goods the plunderers of Europe wish to divide" that the Russian revolutionary Government "declares itself against the seizure of foreign countries" and against the partition of Turkey and Persia.

Today similar motives prompt the official Soviet professions of tolerance for Islam in the USSR, and of friendship with Muslim peoples beyond its borders. Muslims are reminded that religious freedom is guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution. L.I. Klimovich (THE KORAN AND ITS DOGMAS, Alma Ata 1958) says: "The Constitution of the USSR guarantees to citizens of the socialist state genuine freedom of conscience, such as cannot exist in any capitalist state." Statements by Muslim visitors from abroad testifying to the freedom of worship enjoyed by Muslims in the USSR are quoted by Soviet writers in contradiction of "slanders" such as those contained in Muhammad Sami Ashur's book MUSLIMS UNDER COMMUNIST OPPRESSION, published in Cairo (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.1 of 1960, pp.7-9). Mention is made of the large sums spent by the Soviet authorities on the preservation and restoration of the historic mosques and madrasahs of Central Asia (PRAVDA VOSTOKA 1.3.60). The religious leaders of Soviet Muslims (Chairmen of the Muslim Religious Boards) enjoy a position of dignity and respect, and on important religious and other occasions broadcast messages to the Muslim world.

But at the same time Soviet writers themselves - at least when writing for the Soviet public - make no attempt to disguise this state of affairs as one of Soviet support for Islam. As regards freedom of religion under the Soviet Constitution, they point out that Article 124 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of religious worship "and freedom of anti-religious propaganda". The aims of the latter are of course served by the great body of Soviet literature on Islam. As regards the Muslim religious leaders, the position they enjoy confers on them the obligation to support Soviet political initiatives such as the peace movement and current "anti-imperialist" manifestations.

The Soviet view of religion The Soviet view of Islam is of course largely determined by the Soviet view of religion as such; the task of Soviet Islamologists is to apply to the study of Islam the teaching of Marx and Lenin concerning religion, so that although their conclusions on individual points may differ they are always arguing from the same fundamental premises. The latter are clearly and concisely stated in the article "Religion" by Yu.P. Frantsev in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, of which the following are excerpts:

> "As an expression of the downtrodden condition and ignorance of man, religion is in its very essence anti-scientific. Religion is 'the opium of the people' - Lenin called this dictum of Karl Marx the cornerstone of Marxist doctrine on religion."

> "Religious views and the institutions which correspond to them, constituting a superstructure on an economic base, change according to alterations in the condition of life of society and its economic structure; they are historically transient and exist only in determined historical conditions. Marxism-Leninism has exposed idealist fictions of the 'eternity' of religion, and of the ineradicable character of 'religious sentiments', and the fiction that religion is 'inherent' in man, having roots in his nature, and that it is an expression of a social 'link' between people, linking the individual with society."

In the section "Bourgeois and proletarian atheism" in his article Frantsev quotes Lenin as differentiating between the "abstract ideological preaching" of bourgeois atheism and Marxism's "concrete practical class movement, directed to the removal of the social roots of religion". The struggle against religion, says Frantsev, must be a struggle "for the construction of a socialist society which creates the real happiness of the people".

It is in relation to the notion of "the happiness of the people" that Soviet theorists find a fundamental antithesis between the religious and the Marxist ideal. L.I. Klimovich, in ISLAM, ITS ORIGIN AND SOCIAL ESSENCE (Moscow 1956), quotes from the works of Marx and Engels the passage: "The abolition of religion, as an illusory happiness of the people, is the prerequisite of its real happiness." The appeal to man's desire for happiness is one which Communists feel that they alone are entitled to make. This claim to a monopoly of man's spiritual aspirations was exemplified during the early period of Soviet anti-religious propaganda, when certain writers presented Communism in Islamic dress, representing Lenin as Muhammad and Moscow as Medina.

But if religion today is seen as the rival of Communism and denounced as such, what of religious movements before the advent of Communism; does Communism's resentment of its rival extend back into history? Condemnation of religions as having been from the outset an instrument of the exploiting classes is essential to Communist doctrine. However, it seems that, in the Soviet view, religion can in certain circumstances be the vehicle of progressive change. Frantsev, in his encyclopaedia article, says:

> "In the history of society the replacement of certain religious beliefs by others may, in determined conditions of social structure, be connected with progressive manifestations in the life of the peoples, as for example early Christianity, the conversion of Russia, etc; but this does not alter either the reason for the emergence of religious ideas or their essence."

It may be noted that Frantsev's examples of "progressive manifestations" are taken from the history of Christianity. It is interesting to see whether Soviet writers find any such "progressive manifestations" in the history of Islam.

Soviet depreciation of Islam Unlike the Orthodox Church of Russia, Islam has its roots outside Russia. In the early years of the Revolution it rallied armed resistance to the Soviet regime. Muslims today are no longer officially held to account for this, since it is considered that Islam's "social roots" have been eliminated with the victory of socialism. "Pan-Islamism", however, is still a word of evil notoriety in the USSR, and it is remembered as "an instrument of the enemies of the Soviet state" (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, "Pan-Islamism").

At the same time a sense of the foreignness of Islam, together perhaps with some unacknowledged vestige of Christian antipathy towards Mohammedanism, is detectable in Soviet aversion from and disparagement of Islam as a religion. S.P. Tolstov, a leading Soviet ethnologist, in

TRACES OF THE ANCIENT CIVILIZATION IF KHWAREZM (Moscow 1949) described Islam as a "primitive and fanatical" religion, "a chaotic mixture of Christian, Jewish and pagan doctrines", founded by a feudal representative of the merchant class of Mecca with the object of giving a religious pretext to Arab pillaging expeditions. An article by Ghafur Gholam in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 19th April 1950 similarly depicted Islam as a "foreign" religion imposed by fire and sword on the peoples of Central Asia and Transcaucasia by the Arabs, who had destroyed the ancient and flourishing indigenous civilizations of those regions. More recent Soviet accounts of Islam, however, are less extreme in tone.

It would seem that, despite their wholesale condemnation of religion as such, Soviet writers nevertheless consider that there can be both more and less advanced types and stages of religion. They seem much concerned to emphasize the extent of pagan survivals in Islam, as if thereby to discredit it. Thus Klimovich, in ISLAM, ITS ORIGIN AND SOCIAL ESSENCE, observes that Islam preserved the pagan cult of the ka'bah as well as the worship of spirits (jinns), and he notes that in the form of epithets of Allah the names of some pre-Islamic gods were preserved, such as that of the god Rahman. The fast and the festival of sacrifice, he says, were borrowed from ancient Arabian religion, and the five daily prayers from Zoroastrianism. I.N. Vinnikov, in "The Legend of the Call of Muhammad in the Light of Ethnography" (Articles presented to S.F. Oldenburg, 1934) finds analogies to Muhammad's call, and his reactions to it, in pre-Islamic cults; in particular he says that Muhammad's expression of a desire to be wrapped up or to have water poured on him is typical primitive magic.

But the principal charge in the Soviet indictment of Islam is that it is an instrument of reaction. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia states: "Islam, like other religions, has always played a reactionary role, representing in the hands of the exploiting classes an instrument of spiritual oppression of the workers." But, one might ask, if Islam were not being exploited by reaction, could the masses still turn to it for its own sake, in the Soviet view? Such a possibility is not accepted by Soviet Communists. In AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC STUDIES IN THE USSR (Moscow 1954) N.A. Smirnov criticizes Russian and other Islamologists who have suggested that Islam could have a popular appeal. Thus, while praising the factual material contained in Ignatius Goldziher's THE CULT OF SAINTS IN ISLAM, he blames the Hungarian scholar for attempting to separate the Islam of theology from the Islam of popular religion; it is of course impossible, he says, to speak of any religion as "popular". Smirnov finds similar defects in the work of the older generation of Soviet Islamologists. Of A.Ya. Krimskiy (1871-1941) he says that, despite his great erudition, he was unable to expose the class significance of Islam. This was because for Krimskiy "religion was not an ideological superstructure with a clearly expressed class character, but a kind of force which stood above class and which served as almost the only standard

of the people's political, economic and cultural maturity". Smirnov's phrase "a kind of force" epitomizes the incomprehension assumed by Soviet Communists towards the idea of religion being a force in its own right.

Denial of its popular character The notion of popular devotion to Islam for its own sake is vigorously contested by Soviet writers. Smirnov sharply criticizes V.V. Bartold (1869-1930) for suggesting that the "religious tinge" which often characterized peasant movements in the East was in fact due to "the religious requirements of the peasants"; in fact, Smirnov declared, Islam was merely "an emblem of the peasants' struggle against their taskmasters".

Other Soviet writers who have studied popular manifestations in Islam are similarly criticized by Smirnov for failing to emphasize the basically reactionary nature of Islam itself. Thus, commenting on O.A. Sukhareva's article "The Problem of the Cult of Saints in Central Asia" (MATERIAL ON THE ARCHAEOLOGY AND ETHNOGRAPHY OF UZBEKISTAN II, 1950), Smirnov notes that Sukhareva contrasted the dogmatic narrowness of orthodox Islam with the broadly inclusive character of popular observances; and he finds fault with her for failing to remark that, despite this, Islam did not become a religion of the people. Again, one might think it would be difficult for Soviet writers to deny the popular appeal of such a religious movement as the Mahdi rising in the Sudan; but they are evidently expected to do so, for S.R. Smirnov's work on this subject is criticized by N.A. Smirnov as an inadequate exposure of the class origins of the movement and as thereby overestimating its popular character.

A feature of Islam to which Soviet Communists react particularly sharply is Islam's claim not to recognize differences of class or nationality among believers. L. Klimovich (THE KORAN AND ITS DOGMAS, Alma Ata 1958) says that in capitalist countries today the enemies of the workers and peasants try to bemuse them with anti-scientific assertions such as that "Islam levels nations", "Muslims are one nation", "among Muslims there are no classes or class war", Islam reveals "a third road", etc. Such propaganda, he says, has always been particularly intensified during periods of the sharpest liberation struggle of the workers, with the aim of weakening it; but the true facts of the matter were set forth in the third number of the Bolshevist newspaper URAL, published in 1907 in Orenburg in the Tatar language, in an article which is equally topical today:

> "Russian Muslims, just as all other peoples of the world, whatever religion they profess, and to whatever nation they belong, are without exception divided into classes. The Muslims also...have on the one side landlords and capitalists, and on the other peasants and labourers who sell their labour."

It is in the interests of the exploiters themselves, says Klimovich, that Muslim propagandists call for brotherhood between Muslims and try to subordinate their class interests to their religious allegiance. For example, he says, a collection of apocryphal sayings of Muhammad published in Russia in 1910 included the saying: "Help your brother Muslim, without considering who he is, oppressor or oppressed." Muhammad replied: "Help the oppressor to refrain from oppression." For the workers, says Klimovich, this precept of course means to abstain from class struggle and defence of their national and social rights and to remain in misery under the yoke of the exploiters and colonizers.

Sects in Islam Soviet writers on Islam attribute the emergence of sects and separatist movements within Islam to economic, social and political causes and above all to the development of class struggle. But since any Soviet account of a class struggle process is written from the standpoint of sympathy with the oppressed class against its oppressors, the Soviet writer is frequently in the position of expressing support for the adherents of a religious movement, if not for the actual movement itself. This is well exemplified in Ye.A. Belyayev's MUSLIM SECTARIANISM (Moscow 1957).

Discussing the growth of the Shi'i movement and its rapid spread in Persia, Belyayev finds that this was due to the oppressed condition of the Persian masses; they soon fell for the teachings of the Shi'i preachers "who impressed on them that the triumph of Shi'ism would bring a radical improvement of the economic and social position of the workers". But the Shi'i conception of the "hidden Imam", says Belyayev, was a myth designed to divert the attention of the masses from the class struggle towards an ideal of happiness that was unrealizable; and this leads Belyayev to discuss other Messianic phenomena in Islam such as Mahdism, which he similarly condemns as a movement which, while it might initially rally the peasants against their oppressors, nevertheless ends by the establishment of a feudalism of its own.

However, Belyayev detects certain progressive tendencies in early Islam. In his chapter on the Kharijites he contrasts the supporters of Ali, "the followers of the democratic tendencies of early Islam", with the adherents of Mu'awiyah, "expressing the interests of the Arab tribal aristocracy". He goes on to say that the Kharijites, in their secession from both parties, after Ali's compromise with his opponents, "expressed the interests of the broad people's masses", and "by fighting against the ruling clique in the Caliphate objectively defended the interests of the rank-and-file Arab Muslims and the subject population". But their fanatical excesses, he concludes, finally lost them the sympathy of the workers.

This is not an isolated instance of Soviet sympathy with rigorist and puritanical movements in Islam. For example, A.I. Pershits in an article on Saudi Arabia in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.3 of 1955 praises Wahhabism as resisting exaggerated Islamic ritual on the one hand, and on the other hand opposing pagan survivals among the nomad tribes (see MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.4 of 1959). Other writers have represented the Wahhabis' unifying mission in Arabia as a check to the spread of British influence.

Political considerations similarly seem to have coloured Belyayev's attitude to other Islamic sects. He gives a notably unsympathetic account of Ismailism. He represents the Ismaili community as governed by "feudal leaders" who, having deluded simple workers into joining the sect by specious promises of social and material betterment, "regard the people's masses only as an instrument for the attainment of their ambitious political ends". Belyayev gives a short biography of the late Aga Khan which depicts him as an agent of British imperialism. Of the Druze community, on the other hand, Belyayev speaks with praise, remarking that they played an active part in the struggle against French rule in Syria and the Lebanon after the First World War. He represents them as living in a pre-feudal stage of tribal society, and says that they are "distinguished for their high moral qualities - industry, abstinence and modesty"; they regard friendship and mutual aid and support as their sacred duty.

Modernism in Islam Soviet Islamologists appear to have written little about the modernist movement in Islam. References to it are sharply critical. For example Klimovich, in THE KORAN AND ITS DOGMAS, speaks with scorn of attempts to reconcile the teachings of Islam with modern science and to re-interpret the Koran. The examples of modern Islamic thought which he selects for comment are restatements of the doctrines that man can create nothing without God, and that the human mind is incapable of apprehending creation in its entirety. Such notions, he says, serve the aims of imperialism and the exploiting classes by keeping the masses in ignorance and subjection. Similarly he says of the historical criticism of the Koran undertaken by the theological faculty of Ankara university, opened in 1949, that it can only lead to the re-introduction of a shari'ah "expressing no longer feudal but bourgeois interests". In sum, "all attempts to modernize Islam are attempts to retard social development, since with the aid of religion the bourgeoisie seeks to obscure the awareness of the people and thereby postpone the hour of its own doom".

The subject of disbelief in Muslim countries outside Russia is little touched on by Soviet writers. Klimovich, however, makes a passing reference to it. He says that two Czech engineers who visited Libya in 1947 wrote that they had come across "ordinary Muslims who dared deliberately to call in question, although only in the circle of their close friends, the inviolable dogmas of the Koran"; they said that what their country needed was teachers who taught them not about the Koran but about

modern science. Klimovich comments: "There are countries of the non-Soviet East where such bold voices are more numerous and are sounding even louder." Klimovich adds that a proper evaluation of the Koran, as a collection of stories of purely literary value, was given by the Iraqi writer Kazim as-Samawi, in an article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No.9 of 1958.

Yet, for all their disparagement of Islam, Soviet scholars are proud of their record in Islamic studies. N.A. Smirnov (op. cit.) affirms that "Russian scholarship has always held the first place in Islamic studies"; and he speaks of "the originality of growth of Soviet scholarship" in its research into the origins of Islam. Islamic thought and philosophy evidently holds a fascination for Soviet scholars, despite its antagonism to their own ideology. But their refusal to recognize any spiritual or philosophical substance in Islam is the basic weakness of their whole approach to the subject. Moreover, it could be represented as a disparagement of the history and culture of the Muslim peoples. They have therefore been at some pains to extol those Muslim thinkers of the past whom they feel able to extol as "progressive", if not actually as free-thinkers - Averroes, Avicenna, Nizami and others. Recently A.D. Litman suggested that a Soviet revaluation of the history of "philosophical and social-political thought" in the Arab countries was overdue (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.7 of 1959).

(Note: For a detailed account of Islamic studies in Russia, see ISLAM AND RUSSIA, an analysis of N.A. Smirnov's OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC STUDIES IN THE USSR, with introduction by Prof. Ann K.S.Lambton, published by this Centre.)

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE SOVIET PRESS

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Below are reviewed reports on Middle East events appearing in Soviet newspapers during the period 17th July - 12th September.

Persia Western reports of unrest in Persia were quoted in the Soviet press. PRAVDA of 22nd July published a report that 146 Persian officers had been arrested, including five brigadiers, 56 colonels and other senior officers. PRAVDA of 5th August quoted an Italian correspondent's report that the Shah's fear of a revolution was such that he had in permanent readiness, "at a secret aerodrome", a squadron of aircraft laden with his personal belongings.

IZVESTIYA of 12th August published, under the heading "I do not want to serve the American lackeys", a statement by a Persian army officer Rezazadeh Hasan Tagi ogli, of the first training regiment of the Persian Army, stationed in the town of Khorremabad, who had left Persia and sought political asylum in the Soviet Union. He declared that the subjection of the Persian Army to American control had become intolerable, and that the burden of militarization was creating unemployment, misery, starvation and disease among the population; "all in Persia regard the Americans and the Shah with loathing." Many patriotic officers had been executed, but the Shah and his "mercenary generals" could not suppress the fighting spirit of the young officers and patriotic soldiers. "I cannot give the names of the officers who hate the Shah, because I do not want to endanger their lives, but I can affirm that in the army there are many such officers and they are only waiting for the opportunity to eject from the country for ever the hated Yankees and to put an end to the Shah and his regime of tyranny."

Throughout August the Soviet press published reports on what it called the "election mockery" in Persia. It said that the police and gendarmerie were being used to intimidate voters; that voters were being handed ballot papers with the names of Government candidates already marked; and that the elections were being boycotted by voters on a large scale, and a flood of complaints was reaching the Shah and the Government. Prominence was given to reports of a clash between the police and opposition elements, in which 400 persons were said to have been injured.

Initial Soviet comment on the resignation of Eqbal's Government represented it as a blow to the Shah's regime. IZVESTIYA (31.8.60) said that Eqbal had been compelled to resign by the outcry over the scandalous conduct of the elections. "In accepting the resignation of his Prime Minister the Shah pretends that he is not responsible for the actions of the Government, which have aroused widespread displeasure in the country. But, of course, nobody believes this. In reality the Shah is now dismissing a Prime Minister who organized fake elections precisely as his sovereign wished. The fact is simply that, instead of strengthening the existing regime, on which the organizers of the elections counted, they made its position still more shaky. In Tehran they certainly have no regard for the lessons of events in South Korea, Turkey and other countries! Premier Eqbal has already paid for this."

Persian press forecasts of a possible improvement in Persian-Soviet relations following Eqbal's resignation were quoted in Soviet newspapers. A Tass report from Tehran, published in IZVESTIYA and (at greater length) in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 1st September, noted that certain Persian newspapers had expressed satisfaction at the fall of the Government: DAD and AJANG had expressed hopes of a less unpopular foreign policy and a settlement of differences between Persia and other countries, and KEYHAN had expressed the view that the improvement of Persian-Soviet relations was now almost a foregone conclusion.

Turkey On 1st September PRAVDA and the Turkish press published the text of messages exchanged between Khrushchev and the Turkish Premier Gen. Gursel in June/July on the subject of Soviet-Turkish relations. The messages are given below in an appendix to the Middle East section of the Newsletter. Khrushchev's message is particularly relevant to the question whether, in the Soviet view, good relations are possible between the Soviet Union and a State like Turkey which is a member of Western military alliances (see MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.2 of 1960, pp.2-5). Khrushchev said that "the policy of participation in war blocs with the Western powers" had "egged Turkey on to steps which were in no way compatible with the traditional good-neighbour relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union"; but he also stated that "we are not striving to cause a deterioration in Turkey's relations with America or the other Western powers". In his reply Gen. Gursel said that "Turkey's commitments under the defensive alliances to which it belongs leave it enough leeway for arriving at the desired improvement" of Turkish-Soviet relations.

Under the heading "Soviet economic aid to Turkey" PRAVDA (4.8.60) published the report that a cement factory in the outskirts of Istanbul, built with Soviet aid and capable of producing 50,000 cubic metres of cement a year, had been put into operation.

The Central Asian press reported the arrival in Tadzhikistan (25th July) and Uzbekistan (30th July) of a delegation of Turkish agriculturists led by Senel Mehmet, deputy director of the Adana agricultural institute, and Buyukyazici Ogly Bekir, deputy director of the cotton farming institute in Nazilli.

Jordan Soviet newspapers seem not to have published any direct comment on the assassination of the Jordanian Premier, or any suggestions as to the motives or political affiliations of those responsible. Some oblique comments on the matter were published by IZVESTIYA of 31st August, in a dispatch from its London correspondent V. Osipov. Osipov said that British newspapers had voiced profound condolences on the death of a person "who was known in the Near East as a British protege"; but "they publish nothing about the reactions of the Jordanians themselves to this assassination". THE TIMES, said Osipov, had "cast dark hints in the direction of the UAR and the Iraqi Republic"; and other British press comment was directed towards diverting attention from the "delicate question" of Jordanian popular dissatisfaction with the rule of King Husayn, who was more interested in motor-racing than in the condition of his subjects; certainly the Jordanians had sufficient reason to resent the fact that their country remained in effect a British protectorate designed to secure Britain's communications with the oil regions of Kuwait and Bahrain. Hazza al-Majali had been an active advocate of Jordanian adherence to the Baghdad Pact and a violent opponent of the UAR and the Iraqi Republic. According to THE TIMES, Jordanian ruling circles must act

swiftly so that this disturbance should not upset the balance of forces in the region - "and, we add, should not harm the imperial interests of Britain in the Middle East".

UAR The eight anniversary of the Egyptian revolution on 23rd July was marked by long articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, by I. Belyayev and S. Kondrashov respectively, acclaiming the achievements of the Egyptian Republic and the UAR during this period and emphasizing the importance of Soviet aid. Kondrashov said that the "comparative experience" of the UAR in its relations with the USSR and, on the other hand, the USA had shown it that Soviet aid was based on equality between the Soviet and Arab peoples whereas, in Nasir's words, the USA took its stand on friendship for Israel, the enemy of the Arab peoples. Egypt's experience had been taken to heart by Cuba and the Congo, which now turned for aid to the Soviet Union, just as Indonesia, India, Guinea and other countries found in the socialist camp the most reliable defender of their national interests; "is this not a clear illustration of how rapidly the map of the world is changing?" Belyayev said that the imperialist enemies of Soviet-Arab friendship were inventing stories about a "Red peril" in the Middle East, and about the creation of "an Arab Communist empire"; but Nasir himself had repudiated the allegations that the Soviet Union was making use of its aid to interfere in the internal affairs of the UAR.

PRAVDA reported that on 27th August an agreement on Soviet aid in the construction of the second stage of the Aswan High Dam was signed in Moscow by Musa Arafa, Minister of Public Works in the Egyptian region of the UAR, and I.V. Arkhipov, First Vice-President of the Soviet Council of Ministers' State Committee for External Economic Relations. "Under this agreement the Government of the USSR, meeting the wishes of the Government of the UAR, agrees to collaborate with the UAR Government in completing the construction of the Aswan High Dam to its full section with a general dam height of 111 metres, which will make it possible to create a reservoir with a capacity of about 130,000 million cubic metres of water, in constructing a hydro-electric power station with an output of 2.1 million kw, erecting two high-voltage lines of electric power transmitters from Aswan to Cairo and a line of electric power transmitters in Lower Egypt with a total general length of about 2,800 km., and also creating irrigation systems and bringing under cultivation an area of up to 2 million acres. To pay for the planning work carried out by Soviet organisations, and the equipment, machinery and materials delivered from the Soviet Union to the UAR and other services, the Government of the USSR has granted the UAR Government a long-term credit of 900 million roubles at 2.5 per cent with repayment in 12 years."

PRAVDA reported that on 7th September a protocol was signed by Nur ad-Din Kahali, Vice-President of the UAR, and V.N. Novikov, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, concerning the implementation

of the Soviet-Syrian agreement on economic and technical cooperation concluded on 28th October 1957. "The protocol in particular envisages giving technical assistance in the construction of the railway Qamishli - Aleppo - Latakiyah over a mountain pass with a general length of about 770 km., in place of the railway Qamishli - Aleppo, the construction of a factory for nitrogen fertiliser with an output of 110,000 tons of ammonium nitrate a year instead of the 44,000 provided for earlier; the expansion of geological prospecting for oil and other minerals, and also the construction of a plant for lubricating oils with an output of about 25,000 tons a year, and other projects which are important for the economic development of the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic."

Iraq IZVESTIYA of 24th July published, under the heading "Qasim's warning", an account of the statement made by the Iraqi Premier about the operations of the Basrah Petroleum Company (see Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, No.392). Qasim, the paper noted, had complained that the company, by its decision to suspend production from the Rumaylah oilwells and its reduction of output to less than the agreed minimum, was applying pressure on Iraq "under various flimsy pretexts, in order to impair the rights of the Iraqi people"; it was evident that the representative of the oil company, ever since he took up his post in Iraq, had been "creating one obstacle after another in order deliberately to create a conflict between the Iraqi Republic and the oil companies, thus departing from the spirit of cooperation between the two sides"; the company itself must bear the responsibility for all the consequences.

IZVESTIYA reported (21.8.60) the conclusion in Baghdad of an agreement on Soviet aid in reconstructing the Baghdad-Basrah narrow-gauge railway as a standard-gauge line, and provision of a Soviet credit of 180 million roubles, and (1.9.60) the signing of a contract for the construction of an automatic telephone exchange in Baghdad with 10,000 numbers.

Soviet newspapers published reports on the visit to the USSR of the Iraqi Minister of Public Works and Housing Awni Yusuf, 14th-28th August. PRAVDA reported that an Iraqi military delegation of 12 members, led by Gen. Ahmad Salih al-Abdi, Military Governor-General of Iraq and CGS of the Iraqi Army, arrived in Moscow on 2nd September for a visit at the invitation of Marshal Malinovskiy, the Soviet Minister of Defence.

Lebanon On 30th July PRAVDA published a report on the visit of a US destroyer to Beirut, under the heading "The USA is drawing the Lebanon into dangerous adventures". US and NATO forces, said PRAVDA, had been using Beirut port and airport, and the Lebanese people had resolutely protested against this violation of their country's sovereignty; as a result of their protests the US Embassy in Beirut had issued a statement

that no US warship would enter Lebanese territorial waters. However, the US destroyer No.865 had entered the port of Beirut on 23rd July and cast anchor. In the Lebanon its arrival was seen as directly connected with the US "Operation Flying-Fish" - a plan by which, to replace the now unpopular U-2 flights from bases on the territory of their allies, the Americans would achieve their aims with naval forces based in the Mediterranean and using the ports of Beirut, Piraeus, Famagusta and others. Such measures, apparently approved by the Lebanese Government, were regarded in Lebanese political circles as a departure from the Lebanon's policy of neutrality.

Oman PRAVDA noted that the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Cairo had declared 18th July to be "Oman Day"; on 19th July IZVESTIYA and TRUD published articles on the solidarity of the Soviet people with the people of Oman in their "struggle against British aggression".

Cyprus PRAVDA (17 and 20.8.60) published the exchange of messages between Brezhnev and Makarios on the subject of Cyprus's accession to independence and the Soviet Union's desire to establish diplomatic relations with Cyprus. Soviet newspaper articles on the occasion said that the Cypriot people's fierce struggle for independence had forced the British into making concessions; that under the agreement on the British base Cyprus remained as before a NATO bastion and "place d'armes for aggression against the socialist states, against the peoples of the Near and Middle East countries"; and that Cypriot patriots would continue the struggle for the complete eviction of foreign forces from their country.

A PRAVDA report (19.8.60) on Makarios's press conference of 17th August noted that, asked about possible Soviet aid to Cyprus, Makarios said that Cyprus would accept aid from any country so long as it had no political aims and did not seek to influence the policy of the Republic.

APPENDIX

Messages exchanged between Khrushchev and the Turkish Premier

PRAVDA of 1st September published the following messages exchanged between Khrushchev and the Turkish Premier Gen. Gursel in June/July on the subject of Soviet-Turkish relations.

Khrushchev's message To His Excellency Cemal Gursel, Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic: Mr. Prime Minister, I and my colleagues in the Soviet Government have familiarised ourselves with great satisfaction with your latest pronouncements about Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, made during a talk with our Ambassador in Ankara on 14th June of this year. I should like to note, above all, our agreement with you that both Turkey and the Soviet Union have a common desire to make our relations good. We also note and, for our part, ardently welcome the fact that you do not have any objections of principle to the subsequent turning of Soviet-Turkish relations into close co-operation. Since your and our goals will coincide in this respect, this will then be what we must work on, in the interests of the peoples of our two countries.

Of course, we have to solve several questions on this road, questions requiring settlement. We understand your considerations about the complexity of the situation in which Turkey has landed after 10 years of the policy of participation in war blocs with the Western Powers, which egged Turkey on to steps which were in no way compatible with the traditional good-neighbour relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. You are well aware of our attitude to war blocs, as well as our views on the participation in them of our neighbours, and I would not have been frank if I did not state this now too.

Of course, - I shall say this frankly - it is our deep conviction that the most sincere relations between our two neighbour countries would develop if Turkey embarked upon the road of neutrality. This would only benefit the country. Turkey would receive an opportunity to use her resources not for war preparations, on which huge funds have been squandered so far, but for raising the country's national economy and the welfare of its people. Military spendings, Mr. Prime Minister, are a fathomless pit and not every country can endure their burden and develop its economy at the same time. As to Turkey, you of course know better than me that this is so. I have expressed to you my frank opinion. This, of course, is not a condition for beginning the improvement of our relations. We believe that this should be started and any step in this direction, and especially the achievement of this goal, will be greeted by us as by sincere and true friends of the Turkish people and the independent Turkish State. We are not striving also to cause a

deterioration in Turkey's relations with America or the other Western Powers. Such a desire is alien to us. Moreover, we ourselves are striving to have good relations with the Western Powers, including the USA. If we are unable to establish such relations with some of them, or, moreover, to make them good and lasting, this is no fault of ours.

We agree with you that there is no need to postpone the improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations until all their cardinal problems can be fully resolved and that we should at least avoid such actions in the immediate future as could lead to a further deterioration in Soviet-Turkish relations, which under the previous Turkish Government were brought to a state which could not and cannot satisfy either the Soviet Union or Turkey. I deem it necessary, Mr. Prime Minister, to stress once again that the statement of the new Government of Turkey, that it intends to abide by the principles of the policy formulated by the founder of the Turkish Republic and fighter for Turkey's independence, Kemal Ataturk, with whose name friendly and even fraternal relations between our two neighbour countries are associated in our minds, has been received with a feeling of satisfaction in Moscow. We remember Ataturk's words that Soviet-Turkish friendship had so far only benefited international peace and that this friendship would be beneficial and fruitful in the future.

If the new Turkish Government really abides by the policy of Ataturk, we shall all see Soviet-Turkish relations return to the high level of true good-neighbourliness and genuine friendship at which they were in the days of the great founder of the Soviet Union and friend of the eastern peoples, V.I. Lenin and the leader of new Turkey, Ataturk. Your desire that Turkey, despite the binding nature of existing commitments and alliances, should pursue an independent policy, meets with the understanding of the Soviet Government. We in the Soviet Union want most of all to see our neighbour countries prosper and pursue an independent foreign policy. Desirous of improving its relations with neighbouring Turkey, the Soviet Government noted in its well-known statement of 30th May 1953 that the policy of the USSR is based on the Leninist principles of complete respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Turkish State, on the principle of equality of big and small nations, on the principle of peaceful coexistence and co-operation between States with differing socio-economic systems. We abide now too by this position and believe it is necessary and useful to confirm this once again.

The Soviet Government presumes that Turkey, as a State, can in no way benefit from such relations with its northern neighbour as developed and were maintained for several years under the previous Turkish Government. Irrespective of the past, the time has now come to start ridding our relations of the load of various prejudices and to start restoring step by step the confidence which formerly existed in the relations between our two countries. It is absolutely clear that the main thing

now is not to search for questions on which we disagree; on the contrary, we must search for points on which our views coincide, so as to advance along the road of rapprochement.

The Soviet Government hopes that the Government you are heading will view positively the considerations advanced in this letter, considerations which, as it seems to us, coincide on the whole with your pronouncements on the question of Soviet-Turkish relations. Permit me to express the sincere hope that with your direct participation a start will be made on the resumption of the earlier existing friendship and mutual co-operation in the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Sincerely yours (Signed) Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Moscow, the Kremlin, 28th June 1960.

Gen. Gursel's reply To His Excellency Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers: Mr. Chairman, I have studied with lively interest and very great attention your message of 28th June 1960, which was handed to me by the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara. I note with satisfaction the desire expressed in your message to arrive at better relations between our two countries and I can sincerely assure you that I fully share this wish. However, guided by the desire to leave no doubts concerning the position of the Turkish Government on certain points of your message, I should like in this connection to give Your Excellency the following explanations. I wish to add that this clarification in no way reduces the prospects for improving relations between our two countries, but is proof that Turkey's commitments under the defensive alliances to which it belongs leave it enough leeway for arriving at the desired improvement.

The Government which I head was set up as a result of the movement for national reform started on 27th May of this year. This movement, in conformity with its very first statements, did not fail to state with ample clarity that Turkey would remain loyal to its international commitments and, specifically, to those of them which arise from the existence of its alliances, such as NATO and CENTO. These alliances were concluded in conformity with the decisions of the UN Charter. They pursue purely defensive purposes and are a consequence of a lawful and imperative need, which Turkey cannot overlook, lest she should prejudice her independence and security. This policy of alliances pursued by Turkey has nothing incompatible with good-neighbour relations between our two countries. As I have already noted, the alliances to which Turkey belongs are of an exclusively defensive nature and are not directed against any country, only against a potential aggressor.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to dwell on the thought which occurred to me when I was reading your message. I do not think that the pursuance of a neutral policy can free the Government from military expenditure. If

APPENDIX (Cont.)

it were so, then such countries as Sweden, Switzerland or India for that matter, would have no military budgets. However, these countries, as you certainly know, maintain considerable means of defence, pressing as a heavy burden on their budgets. They do so because they feel it necessary despite their neutralist policies. In reality, liquidation or at least reduction of military expenditures can be made possible not by neutrality but by the establishment of a system of universal disarmament with an effective control mechanism, which would ensure the security of all the countries of the world, either big or small, against any aggression on the part of any State. Until the creation of such a system of international disarmament, towards which Turkey is striving just as passionately as any other country sincerely desiring peace, no State can renounce the means of ensuring its security. Turkey, prompted by this lawful concern, remains loyal to its policy of membership in collective security systems.

I am happy to learn that the establishment of a new regime in Turkey was favourably received in Moscow. I can confirm to you that in the sphere of international relations too my Government will abide by the principles of Ataturk. Let me emphasize in this connection that far from ever contradicting the pursuance by Turkey of a policy of multilateral co-operation with a view to securing peace and the independence of nations, these principles, on the contrary, are a logical foundation of this policy. Proof of this is the fact that already in 1934 and 1937 Turkey was successfully working in accordance with these principles to create the Balkan and Saadabad Pacts, whose purpose was to preserve the independence of their members and the peace of the area in question.

I note with great satisfaction, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Government desires to confirm its statement of 30th May 1953; I, just like you, really believe that the genuine improvement of relations between our countries is possible within the framework of the principles advanced in this statement, principles which Turkey, for its part, has never rejected.

In conclusion I would like again to express the hope that the considerations I have set forth above will convince Your Excellency that nothing in Turkish policy obstructs the improvement of relations between our two countries. It suffices for this policy to meet the same good will on the part of the Soviet neighbour. The letter of Your Excellency, and particularly the part mentioning the need, throwing aside any prejudiced views whatsoever, to direct our joint efforts towards the solution of those problems on which our viewpoints coincide, give me hope that a similar desire also exists on the Soviet side.

Please accept, Mr. Chairman, this expression of my deep respect. (Signed) Cemal Gursel, Head of State and Prime Minister. Ankara, 8th July 1960.

ZIMBABWE

The level of civilization attained by African states before the coming of the European is a subject that receives much emphasis in Soviet studies. Ol'derogge and Potekhin, in PEOPLES OF AFRICA (Moscow 1954) mention some 68 such states, and in many cases (such as Ghana, Songai, Congo and Buganda) describe in some detail their organization and culture. It is therefore not surprising that the civilization of Monomotapa, whose vestiges remain today in the great stone ruins of Zimbabwe and other sites in Southern Rhodesia, should engage the attention of a Soviet scholar. In SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.2 of 1960 L.A. Fadeyev examines the archaeological evidence for this civilization, and advances a theory of his own regarding its origin.

The "historiography" of Zimbabwe Fadeyev begins by discussing the various theories of the origin of the Zimbabwe culture, which he lists under five headings: (1) ancient Semitic; (2) Dravidian; (3) Hamitic; (4) A diffusion of cultural elements and ideas from outside into the environment of the Bantu, the builders of the Zimbabwe monuments; (5) the theory of the indigenous origin of the Zimbabwe culture.

The historiography of Zimbabwe, says Fadeyev, exhibits a "struggle" between different schools of bourgeois Africanists; and it is perhaps surprising that, from the outset, he concedes the existence of a "progressive" trend among bourgeois scholars themselves. He speaks of "the struggle of two ideologies in bourgeois African studies - the ideology of imperialism, which considers the negroes an inferior race, not capable of independent development, and justifies the seizure of African lands, and a progressive ideology, based on the principles of equality of peoples and races, advocating a careful study of the aboriginals of Africa and recognition of its outstanding role in the history of world culture".

The first two theories, the ancient Semitic and the Dravidian, says Fadeyev, have now been completely discarded; the main opponents of the indigenous thesis are now the supporters of either the Hamitic or the "diffusionist" theories.

> "The accumulation of scientific data and the impossibility of denying the participation of the Bantu in erecting the monuments of the region between the Limpopo and the Zambesi have forced the supporters of the non-African origin of the Zimbabwe culture to adapt themselves more subtly to the situation and to work out new forms of the struggle. The thesis of the non-African origin of the Zimbabwe culture is upheld now in a veiled form by the theorists of diffusionism and 'Hamitism'. The diffusionists, to whose number belong some of the most important researchers of the Zimbabwe culture (Caton-Thompson, Lestrade

and others), recognize the indigenous nature of this culture, but cancel this idea out by asserting that at the basis of the given culture are ideas which penetrated the Bantu environment from the outside."

Soviet Africanists reject the "Hamitic theory" which, according to Ol'derogge (WESTERN SUDAN IN THE 15th-19th CENTURIES, Leningrad 1960), "asserts that for all or almost all their achievements the peoples of Africa are indebted to light-skinned Hamitic peoples who invaded Africa in a series of successive waves". According to Fadeyev, the Hamitic theory was first applied to the Zimbabwe culture by Prof. L. Frobenius in the 1920s, and its latest exponents are G.A. Wainwright and P.-L. Breutz. Fadeyev regards as unconvincing Wainwright's attempt to prove that the Zimbabwe culture was created by Hamitic Galla from Ethiopia who migrated south. He finds that Breutz's theory, put forward in 1956, is at a first glance more solidly based, but that his claim that an Ethiopian-Semitic culture was responsible for the Zimbabwe constructions flies in the face of the scientific facts. "His whole work is directed to proving that the Bantu are culturally passive and incapable of independent development... Breutz's theory, like Wainwright's, is an attempt to find confirmation for preconceived ideas by way of a regrouping of real facts convenient to the author."

Value of the work of Schofield and Summers A correct idea of the origin of the Zimbabwe culture, says Fadeyev, can only be formed by a systematic study of all the ethnographic and archaeological data. Fadeyev accepts Miss G. Caton-Thompson's stratigraphy as the basis for archaeological work, and goes on to describe the classification by Wieschoff, Caton-Thompson, Schofield and others of the different finds in the ruins. From these, he says, it is clear that iron was the basic metal of the Zimbabwe culture. The different metal tools and weapons found were common to large areas of Africa and are very close to those in current use, which points to an African origin for these articles. The rich finds of pottery are remarkably close in type, "forcing one to suppose a unified ceramic tradition for the whole region between the rivers". The dating and origin of the many glass beads is still not solved (the Africans did not know how to make glass). Fadeyev agrees with Dornand and Schofield in thinking that the sculptured soapstone birds were not the product of an imported culture but a continuation of the ancient sculptural tradition of the region.

Fadeyev remarks that the detailed archaeological study of the 1940s and 1950s has produced the best contemporary theories of the origin of the Zimbabwe culture. He gives particular attention to the work of Schofield and Summers. He notes (and apparently approves) Schofield's periodization (1942) of the culture into: (1) pre-Monomotapa; (2) Monomotapa; (3) defeat of Monomotapa by the related Rozwi tribe, and finally invasion by the Nguni.

"R. Summers' theory, which takes into account the main achievements of bourgeois African studies, is very interesting". Summers divides the Zimbabwe Culture into three phases: iron age A, a period of interaction of iron ages A, B, AB and C, and iron age D. Under the influence of waves of African migrations from the north and west, which he connects with his different iron age cultures, the primitive agricultural and hunting community of the region turned to mining and cattle-raising, and in the 15th century the state of Monomotapa was formed. "It is true that Summers allows a certain inconsistency in his evaluation of this culture ... but at the basis of his views on the origin of the Zimbabwe Culture lies the conviction that 'Zimbabwe was built by Africans for Africans'."

The views of Schofield and Summers were accepted by the most progressive Western scholars. "Progressive bourgeois Africanists have succeeded in solving certain problems ... There is now no doubt that the Bantu built Zimbabwe ... However, in the works of these researchers ... we find common to all an indifference to the social relations of the creators of the Zimbabwe culture, an underestimation of the destructive effect of European colonization and finally a lack of consistency in defending the thesis of the indigenous nature of Zimbabwe. All these researchers, explaining the origin and development of different sides of the culture, are inclined to connect them not with the internal development of society but with migrations and an intermingling of cultural influences without which they are unable to imagine a single major advance in culture."

An indigenous culture Fadeyev arrives at his own theory of the origin of Zimbabwe by a process of accepting some and rejecting others of the conclusions reached by Western archaeologists. He insists on the basic role of "the ancestors of the Bushmen" in the development of the Zimbabwe culture. To this end he links the iron culture of Zimbabwe with that of other sites such as Mapungubwe and Mumbwa; on the basis of pottery finds at Mapungubwe, he says, L. Fouche (MAPUNGUBWE, Cambridge 1937) attributed its iron culture to the ancestors of the Bushmen, and Schofield concluded that the stone tools found together with iron at Mumbwa and other sites similarly indicated that the iron dated from the Wilton epoch.

At the same time Fadyev points out that Summers has attributed the earliest very rough stone constructions found at the lowest levels at Zimbabwe and other sites to the "iron age A" period.

The contribution of the Bantu to the beginnings of the Zimbabwe culture is admitted by Fadeyev, but he rejects the theory of "migration waves" of Bantu in favour of his notion of an early and lengthy period of "interaction between the ancestors of the Bushmen and the Bantu who constantly penetrated into the territory between the two rivers". The

distinction between "constant penetration" and "immigrant waves" is perhaps a tenuous one, but is essential to Fadeyev's thesis that the stimulus to cultural advance was all the time coming from within the region itself and not from outside. Indeed, in his reaction against the idea of an immigrant culture he goes even further; after rejecting the notion that the Zimbabwe buildings were the work of Hamitic immigrants from Uganda (a notion based on similarity with the buildings of Bantu settlements in Western Uganda) Fadeyev affirms that "the region between the Zambesi and the Limpopo may be regarded as the birthplace of one of the outstanding stone-building cultures of Africa", and that "in our view there are more grounds for speaking of the influence of the south on the north than the other way round".

The last section of Fadeyev's article consists of a reconstruction of the development of social relationships in the state of Monomotapa. Fadeyev accuses bourgeois researchers of paying no attention to social relationships. He maintains that from the scanty material available it is reasonable to assume that the region between the rivers went through the normal phases of development from a primitive communal society to a union of tribes in a military democracy. He sums up his article as follows:

> "The problem of the origin of Zimbabwe is still far from a final solution. However ... attempts to explain its origin by a migration into the area of representatives of a more highly developed race, or by the impact of a superior, alien civilisation on the culture of the Bantu have proved untenable. The indigenous nature of the Zimbabwe culture is beyond doubt. It is apparent also that the main features of this culture - metallurgy, ceramics and building in stone - were formed on the territory between the rivers and were not brought there by different waves of Bantu migrations, as Summers suggests. The Zimbabwe culture was not only 'created by Africans for Africans', but was a legitimate outcome of the development of the peoples of that area, who made the transition from stone to metal, from primitive agriculture and hunting to a well-developed economy based on cattle-raising and hoe farming, from a primitive communal system to the rudiments of statehood - the military democracy of Monomotapa."

It is evident that, although wishing to disparage the "bourgeois historiography" of Zimbabwe, Fadeyev found it impossible to deny that, according to the consensus of authoritative opinion, Zimbabwe is of Bantu origin. In his attempt to go further than the acknowledged "bourgeois" conclusion that the Zimbabwe culture was "created by Africans for Africans" he advances (with little supporting data) an extreme theory to which one might well apply the description he himself gives of Breutz's "Hamitic"

theory - "an attempt to find confirmation for preconceived ideas by way of a regrouping of real facts convenient to the author".

THE ORIENTALISTS' CONGRESS: A DELEGATE'S IMPRESSIONS

(The following notes on the African section of the World Congress of Orientalists are contributed by a British delegate to the Congress)

When one is asked for one's impressions of the African section of the XXVth World Congress of Orientalists held in Moscow from 9th to 14th August, it is probable that besides wanting to hear about the contributions to knowledge made or first published at the Congress, the questioner also wants to hear some assessment of the calibre and approach of the Soviet writers and research workers in this field. And if in the personal observations which follow the emphasis is on the latter question, this must not be allowed to push into the background the several excellent papers contributed by scholars from African, American, British and French universities simply because these were by authors with whose work one is more familiar.

In his speech at the opening session of the Congress, Mr. Gafurov, Chairman of the Oriental Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science, gave what were in his view the three distinguishing features of Soviet oriental studies. These were:-

(1) an emphasis on the study of current problems;

(2) a new interpretation of the past, which disentangled a unitary process of social development through a variety of national forms;

(3) the collection and study of rare manuscripts which, among other things, provided a cultural link right across the Sudan belt of Africa.

In regard more particularly to Africa, the newly organised (October 1959) Africa Institute of the Academy planned to concentrate on the history, economics, linguistics and culture of the continent.

The African studies section was sub-divided into History and Linguistics. About half the papers read in the former dealt with historical subjects; the other half included papers on sociology, religious beliefs, art and literature, and economics. Dr. I.I. Potekhin presided over the sub-section on history, and Professor D.A. Ol'derogge over that

of linguistic studies (with individual scholars from other countries taking the chair in turn for each day's sessions).

The extent to which "current problems" meant "current political issues" was determined by the subjects of the papers which were presented. On the whole these were intended to be, and to a large extent were, contributions to the study of African history, political and social institutions, culture and art. The stumbling-blocks in discussion were the wearisome repetitions of the phrase "colonial slavery", the inability (whether genuine or assumed) to stand back and view the matter in hand without a distorting mirror, without the echo of old Comintern positions. One longed just once to hear some Soviet scholar say: Well, we in Central Asia found that so-and-so ... Would this be at all relevant?"

The contributions themselves varied of course in quality and in the inherent interest of their material. This brings one to the vital point, namely, the limitations to intellectual enquiry set by "the new interpretation of the past which disentangles a unitary process of social development". It was these limitations which the delegates from the Western countries found the most hampering. Marxist interpretations have a particularly hobbling effect on Soviet African studies (and on African studies in the Warsaw Pact countries, judging from the showing made at the Congress), first because they interpose between the researcher's mind and the impact on it of his findings, and secondly because in the nature of things the first-hand data available to Soviet Africanists is extremely scanty and defective, and hence the theories and interpretations protrude even more rigidly and inflexibly and with a wearisome inevitability. It is perhaps unfair and ungenerous to pick on individuals, but the contrast was well illustrated in the case of a paper on the social organisation of a Kabyl village; in reply to a pressing interlocutor, who asked him how his findings could fit into the progressive stages of social development, the author replied that his task was to study and to record what he saw. In another paper dealing with the changes in German colonial policy in 1888, based on the Kolonialarchiv (i.e. on source material not hitherto generally available), after the opening sentences one knew that the ruling house, the landed aristocracy, and the banking monopolies were going to be the villains and the sole policy-makers and that Peters was going to be their agent, and sure enough all these propositions emerged and fell into their appointed pigeon holes.

But, having said all this, there are yet certain positive aspects and possibilities to record. The African Institute of the Academy has come to stay; but its members, at any rate at present, are eager and ready for contact with research scholars in African, American, British and French universities, and for bibliographical material. They recognise their isolation and deficiencies in field work. The papers on the new studies in African history and archaeology read by three of the British historians and archaeologists made the Soviet and East German scholars

realize for the first time that "African history" in English and French-speaking universities no longer meant the history of the metropolitan powers in Africa. It may be that Soviet anthropologists also realized that American sociology had for a long time been entirely free from the "comparative racial theories" of the 1870's. A plea to describe land tenure systems as they in fact were in each individual case without tying labels to them charged with evocative meaning was listened to with attention. For such reasons one can hope that all the hard work put into the six days of the Congress by the participants may not have been wasted, not only as far as African studies are concerned, but possibly (though at present it certainly does not look like it) also as regards moving African studies however slightly away from the sphere of the cold war.

In conclusion, one would like to add a few personal observations. It was a pity so few African scholars were able to be present; one missed particularly those from English and French-speaking universities. This no doubt will be remedied in future. Also a more representative international display of books and publications would have been appreciated. There was too much worthless and ephemeral literature on show on the mainly Russian bookstalls. But this too can be remedied another time.

THE CONGO IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Congo events appearing in Soviet newspapers during the period 26th July - 21st September.

Soviet reporting of the Congo events During most of this period PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA published dispatches from their correspondents in Leopoldville, O. Orestov and N. Khokhlov. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA alsu published occasional dispatches from its special correspondent L. Volodin. By 8th September, however, Orestov was back in Accra; and Khokhlov sent no more reports after his last dispatch from Leopoldville reporting Mobutu's coup of 14th September.

Development of the Soviet attitude The Soviet Union has throughout the crisis taken its stand on its own interpretation of the Security Council resolutions of 14th and 22nd July. During the first part of the period under review, Soviet attention was concentrated on the question of the evacuation of Belgian forces; but when the question of evacuation from Katanga came to the fore, the directives in the Security Council resolution referring to UN military aid for the Congo Government and consultation

with it became the basis of the Soviet demand for immediate UN military action to remove the Belgian forces from Katanga and arrest the Katanga leaders (Soviet statement of 6th August, below). The special interpretation placed by the Soviet Union on the principle of non-interference by the UN forces in the internal affairs of the Congo was clearly shown in the matter of UN intervention in Katanga. As interpreted by Mr. Hammarskjoeld, the principle meant refusal to intervene in the conflict between Katanga and the central Congo Government; as interpreted by the Soviet Union, it meant that the UN command was obliged to support the attitude of the central Government, and not "intervene" in the conflict by recognizing the existence of the Tshombe Government.

But the Soviet Government went further in envisaging and indeed calling for action in the event of the UN forces not carrying out what the Soviet Union considered to be their proper tasks. Firstly, it called for removal of the command of the UN forces; secondly, it called for action outside the UN to "repel aggression", and stated that it would itself take such action.

Removal of the UN command was called for in (a) the Soviet statement of 6th August ("If the present command ... does not in future abide by the decisions of the Security Council ... then this command should be changed and a new one appointed"); (b) the Soviet statement of 19th September ("The command which is using the troops, dispatched to the Congo in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council, for purposes for which they were not intended must be dismissed"); (c) the Soviet draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on 15th September, which "charges the Secretary-General to remove the present command of the UN forces, whose actions constitute a gross violation of the Security Council resolutions on the Congo".

The possibility of action outside the UN, or at least over the head of the UN command, was envisaged in (a) the Soviet statement of 1st August ("If the aggression against the Congo continues, the Soviet Government ... will not hesitate to take decisive measures aimed at repelling the aggressors"); (b) the Soviet statement of 21st August ("If the aggressors do not clear out of the Congo ... then the peace-loving countries will be faced with the necessity of taking other steps to stop the aggression, in accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council"); (c) the Soviet statement of 10th September ("If the Security Council for some reason is unable to discharge its duty, the States which respect the earlier resolutions on assistance to the Congo at this hour of trial of the Congolese people must render every support to the legitimate Government of the Congo Republic").

The Soviet picture of "aggression" in the Congo was greatly expanded during this period. Whereas the Katanga issue was seen as a futile imperialist attempt, with NATO and US backing and UN connivance, to halt

the march of African liberation, the crisis within the central Congo Government and the UN command's reactions to it were represented as the result of a plot between the USA, NATO and the UN command to "internationalize the aggression"; in the words of PRAVDA (12.9.60) "Hammarskjoeld is trying to use the blue flag of the UN to cover up a treacherous plot against the young African Republic."

Soviet solidarity with Lumumba's Government, and with Lumumba personally, was a feature of all reports and comment. Lumumba's broadcasts, press conferences, messages, etc. were given prominence, and the development of the Soviet attitude towards the UN forces followed closely Lumumba's own statements on the subject.

The question of Soviet aid The Soviet attitude towards aid for the Congo was set forth in the Soviet Government statement published in PRAVDA on 1st August. According to this statement, attempts were being made to "disorganize the Congo's economy and with the aid of famine break the will of its people", and it was therefore the duty of every State which valued the ideals of freedom and independence to give the Congo economic aid. The Congo Government had appealed to the Soviet Union and other States for such aid, and the Soviet Union "expresses its readiness to consider favourably the question of giving the Congo extensive economic assistance". The Soviet Government had already sent the Congo 10,000 tons of food supplies; Soviet aircraft were transporting UN troops to the Congo, and delivering freight; a Soviet steamer would shortly deliver 100 Soviet lorries, with spare parts and a repair workshop accompanied by a group of instructors; and a group of Soviet doctors and medical personnel, with medicines and equipment, would arrive shortly. The Soviet Union was ready to give the Congo economic and technical aid and to develop trade with it "and will not make any conditions of a political, military or other nature which would infringe the interests and sovereign rights of the independent Congo Republic".

PRAVDA of 11th September published in full the Soviet Government Note sent to the UN Secretary-General in reply to his protests about the aircraft and lorries supplied to the Congo Government by the Soviet Union. The main points of the Soviet Note were that the Security Council resolutions in no way limited the Congo Republic's right to receive aid direct from other countries; that the provision of civil aircraft and lorries to the Congo, so far from contravening these resolutions, was in accordance with their directive on aid for the Congo; and that the Soviet aircraft, unlike those sent by the USA, had purely civilian crews.

On 14th August IZVESTIYA reported that the Soviet Ambassador Yakovlev had handed over to Lumumba the Soviet Government's gift of an "IL-14" aircraft. On 3rd September IZVESTIYA reported that 10 "IL-14" aircraft bringing foodstuffs from Moscow had arrived in Stanleyville, and had then flown on to Leopoldville.

On 28th August PRAVDA reported that questions of cultural relations between the Congo and the Soviet Union had been discussed at a meeting in Leopoldville between Lumumba and G.A. Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Practical measures to give effect to Soviet-Congolese cultural cooperation were decided on; in particular, 150 Congolese students would shortly leave for Moscow for study in Soviet higher educational institutions.

The Question of UN Intervention in Katanga

At the end of July the main subject of Soviet press comment on the Congo was the fact that UN forces had not yet been sent to Katanga to supervise the withdrawal of Belgian forces. For this situation the UN command and Hammarskjoeld himself were held responsible. At the same time UN moves towards negotiation with Tshombe's Government were represented as interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, inasmuch as they constituted recognition of a separatist Government. The following account of Soviet press comment illustrates this attitude.

27.7.60 IZVESTIYA (dispatch from Khokhlov in Leopoldville) "Verbally, Bunche expresses himself for a united Congo and does not recognize a separate Katanga. In fact the UN troops which he heads serve as a covering force not for the evacuation of Belgian aggressive troops, as is laid down by the Security Council resolutions, but for their regrouping and subsequent concentration in the province of Katanga."

1.8.60 PRAVDA (dispatch from Orestov on Hammarskjoeld's talks in Leopoldville) "At the reception for Hammarskjoeld Gizenga, the Congolese Vice-Premier ... declared that, above all, the Congolese people did not understand why the Congolese, who had turned for aid to the UN, were being systematically disarmed, while the Belgians kept their arms and were simply asked to concentrate 'in those parts of our Congo which they dare to call Belgian bases' ... In his reply Hammarskjoeld did not answer a single one of Gizenga's questions. His speech and also the fact that ... he gave no promise to activate the UN forces, arouse serious indignation among the Congolese public."

PRAVDA published a Soviet statement which declared: "If the aggression against the Congo continues, the Soviet Government, taking into consideration its dangerous consequences for the cause of general peace, will not hesitate to take decisive measures aimed at repelling the aggressors, who are acting, as has now become abundantly clear, virtually with the encouragement of all the colonial powers of NATO." The statement went on to give details of Soviet aid to the Congo; see above under "The question of Soviet aid".

4.8.60 IZVESTIYA (dispatch from Khokhlov) The discussions between Congolese Government and UN representatives revealed two tendencies: the Congolese demanded immediate and decisive UN measures to remove the Belgian forces from Katanga, and Hammarskjoeld suggested a compromise. "Later in the day the Congolese Government Commissioner for Katanga Affairs, Sendwe, held a press conference at which he declared that if UN units do not enter Katanga the Government will be compelled to turn for military aid to the brotherly African countries, to send their forces there. There followed a broadcast by Hammarskjoeld ... He stated that units from African countries, under UN command, will enter Katanga territory on Saturday. Twenty-four hours earlier Ralph Bunche must go to Elizabethville with his staff. After the eviction of Belgian forces new elections will be held in the province. Thus in the Katanga question, which the colonialists of all colours seek to turn into an object of barter and political intrigue, the Republic of the Congo has won its first success."

5.8.60 PRAVDA (dispatch from Orestov) "Hammarskjoeld's statement is very clear as to the plans of the UN command, but it still does not resolve all problems connected with Katanga. It was apparent to all in the Congo that sooner or later Hammarskjoeld would have to decide on the entry of forces into Katanga. But the dilatoriness of which Hammarskjoeld gives evidence in his declaration, the inadequate number of UN forces, and transport difficulties, have all resulted in valuable time being lost, and the Katanga reactionaries have already woven a whole network of plots and intrigues with the imperialist powers ... The UN representative could not explain with whom Bunche was intended to conduct discussions in Katanga, where as is well known there are no lawful representatives of the Congolese Government ... Hammarskjoeld's position /his refusal to permit Congolese Government representatives with an escort of Ghana soldiers to accompany the UN mission/ has aroused violent indignation in Congolese Government circles, which regard with great suspicion Bunche's mission, which they do not understand. The Secretary-General's conduct shows that he does not intend to honour his own declaration of yesterday regarding 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of the Congo, and that he does not intend either to cooperate with the lawful Government of the country or to take into account its interests and those of the Congolese people."

6.8.60 IZVESTIYA (article by K. Smirnov on the result of Bunche's talks in Elizabethville, and the cancellation of the decision to send UN forces into Katanga on 6th August) "These facts cannot fail to arouse the deep indignation of every honest person who hoped that the UN would at last fulfil its duty and that Hammarskjoeld and his collaborators would put into effect the Security Council resolutions ... The next hours will show how Hammarskjoeld will conduct himself - whether he will call to order the American Bunche, who instead of carrying out the Security Council

resolutions has gone outside his instructions and conducted negotiations with the Belgian aggressors and their puppet Tshombe, or whether Hammarskjoeld will himself take the same path."

PRAVDA published a Soviet Government statement which called for the following measures:

1. Remove all Belgian troops from the territory of the Congo Republic at the earliest possible date, not hesitating to use any means of coercion to carry this out.

2. If the present command of the troops sent by certain States to the Congo Republic to assist the Congolese Government does not in future abide by the decisions of the Security Council which bound it to act only in agreement with the Government of the Congo Republic and give it the necessary military assistance, then this command should be changed and a new one appointed which will honourably and unswervingly fulfil the obligations put on it by decision of the Security Council.

3. Take decisive and effective measures without delay to stop the occupation of an integral part of the Congo Republic - the province of Katanga. Those persons in Katanga who carry out the instructions of foreign invaders and regardless of the laws of the Congo Republic commit actions directed against the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of the Congo Republic should be arrested and handed over to the Government of the Congo Republic.

4. If the troops of this or that country, sent to the Congo in accordance with the Security Council resolution, are not in a position for one reason or another to ensure the effective removal of the troops of the interventionists from the territory of the independent Congolese State, then troops should be sent to the Congo Republic from those countries which are ready to take part in implementing this just action.

7.8.60 Articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA affirmed that Hammarskjoeld's decision not to send UN forces into Katanga was a serious blow to the authority and prestige of the UN, which could only be restored by a Security Council decision on the immediate withdrawal of Belgian forces from Katanga and the cessation of attempts to separate this province from the Congo Republic. Articles spoke of Hammarskjoeld's "capitulation" to "the colonialists and their puppet Tshombe".

10.8.60 K. Smirnov, reviewing the Security Council session in an IZVESTIYA article, criticized Hammarskjoeld's report. He said that it "gives the impression that the Secretary-General awaited not so much new instructions as possibilities for the sabotage of the resolutions earlier taken by the Council". The US representative Lodge "by his immoderate praise of Hammarskjoeld made it clear with whose blessing and on whose instructions the Secretary-General was in fact acting". However, the Council session did not proceed as the colonialists and their supporters had hoped; "the new resolution /moved by Tunisia and Ceylon/ represents a victory for the peace-loving forces striving for the defence of the Congo Republic and the defeat of the colonizers."

13.8.60 PRAVDA published an account by I. Aleksandrov of what it called the "comedy" of Hammarskjoeld's arrival in Elizabethville, with a "body-guard" of 220 Swedish soldiers; "evidently the UN Secretary-General holds the UN's authority very cheap, when he lowers himself to the shameful role of suppliant of the Belgian colonisers' puppet."

14.8.60 K. Smirnov, in a similar account in IZVESTIYA of Hammarskjoeld's alleged truckling to Tshombe's pretensions, said that in the large Union Miniere villa put at Hammarskjoeld's disposal there was a bath in each of the five rooms allotted to him; "but even in all these baths Mr. Hammarskjoeld cannot wash off the mud with which he has besmirched himself by embracing the traitor Tshombe!" Hammarskjoeld had made an "unlawful and shameful compact" with Tshombe, which he had already begun to put into effect without waiting for the Security Council's agreement; on his instructions Bunche had informed the Congo Government that it would have no support from the UN in its attempt to extend its authority to Katanga. The UN Secretary-General's conduct had aroused the indignation of the Congolese people and of all the peoples of Africa who supported them; the Ghana Government had issued a statement declaring that the UN could only have dealings with the lawful Government of the Congo Republic. "That is what all right-thinking and all honest people think. To judge by all appearances, Mr. Hammarskjoeld is not of their number."

PRAVDA published an account by Orestov of Lumumba's press conference in which he expressed his resentment at the fact that Hammarskjoeld had proceeded to Katanga without any consultation with his Government in Leopoldville. "Lumumba declared that the fact that the UN sent to Katanga only European forces shows that there is some kind of collusion between the UN Secretary-General and Belgium."

17.8.60 IZVESTIYA "Hammarskjoeld could not prevent the inevitable - the fiasco of the colonialists and their agents in the Congo - but he is trying to lessen the blow which has struck them and to prevent the

people of the Congo fully enjoying their independence in a united State. It is precisely for this criminal purpose that Hammarskjoeld continues to insist on UN 'non-interference' in relations between the legal Government of the Congo Republic and the rebel Tshombe. These are ... the reasons why the Congolese people have lost confidence in the UN Secretary-General."

(On 19th and 21st August PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA published detailed accounts of press conferences given by Lumumba in which he accused the UN command of obstructing attempts to remove remaining Belgian forces, alleged that Hammarskjoeld was ignoring the central Congolese Government, and declared that "consequently we can no longer accord him our confidence".)

The Airport Incident of 18th August

On 20th August K. Smirnov in IZVESTIYA gave an account of the incident at Leopoldville airport on 18th August (in which Canadian signals personnel were beaten and kicked by Congolese soldiers). Smirnov said that the Canadian soldiers were "ostensibly sent to serve in a signals unit" in the Congo, but the discovery in the aircraft of a far larger quantity of arms than that necessary for signals purposes was "extremely suspicious, since it has been established that a systematic secret arming of the enemies of the lawful Congo Government has been in progress". A "shooting incident" took place while Congolese soldiers were carrying out their duties, and the UN command took advantage of this to bring up reinforcements to the airport and drive out the Congolese guard by force, giving orders to shoot anyone, including Congolese soldiers, who tried to enter the airport. "Such actions by the UN command, carried out not without Hammarskjoeld's knowledge, are a flagrant violation of the Security Council resolution." PRAVDA of 21st July reported that Kuznetsov had made a complaint to Hammarskjoeld.

(PRAVDA of 8th August reported that Kuznetsov had handed to Hammarskjoeld a communication protesting against the dispatch to the Congo of Canadian forces, as allies of Belgium in NATO. An IZVESTIYA dispatch from Ottawa on 26th August reported that every morning for some days US transport aircraft had been taking off from Trenton airport with arms and military supplies for the Congo; Canada's interest in the Congo, said the correspondent, was due to the close links between Canadian capital and Belgian companies operating in the Congo.

The Security Council Session of 21st August

The UN Security Council session of 21st August was preceded by some notable declarations. PRAVDA (22.8.60) reported Kuznetsov's press

conference in New York at which he affirmed Soviet readiness to join other countries in aid to the Congo. "This does not mean, he declared, that the Congo Government cannot have bilateral agreements on aid from the Soviet Union. Kutznetsov observed that the Congo Government has the right to take any measures to ensure the security and independence of its country. He recalled the Soviet Government statement on the Congo question, which stated that the Soviet Union was ready to aid this country to repel foreign aggressors."

The Soviet position was also set forth in a Soviet Government statement (PRAVDA 21.8.60). This began by denouncing "aggression and plans to dismember the Republic", and expressing support for Lumumba: "the old truth has been confirmed here that the popular masses at a critical moment give their trust and support precisely to those personalities and parties which boldly and consistently defend their vital interests." It went on to acclaim African solidarity with the Congolese Government; to denounce alleged plans to create a"foreign legion" in Katanga from soldiers of NATO countries including Belgium; and to condemn the UN Secretary-General's dealings with Tshombe. It concluded:

> The USSR Government hopes that the UN Security Council will obtain strict implementation of the decisions it has taken and carry through to the end the matter of putting a stop to the aggression against the Congo Republic, the withdrawal from its territory of all the troops of the interventionists and the guarding of its independence and sovereignty.
>
> The Soviet Government fully supports the demand of the Government of the Congo Republic about the immediate despatch to the Congo of representatives of a number of neutral countries as observers. It insists on the removal of the obstacles to sending to Katanga province troops of the legal Congolese Government and of those African States who responded to the appeal of the Security Council to assist in stopping the foreign intervention in the Congo.
>
> Identifying itself with all the States striving to give all-round aid and support to the Government of the Congo Republic in achieving the aims indicated above, the USSR Government declares that it, for its part, will undertake the measures necessary for this. If the aggressors do not clear out of the Congo Republic and do not desist from plans to dismember it, then the peace-loving countries will be faced with the necessity of taking other steps to stop the aggression, in accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council.

The result of the Security Council session, at which the Soviet delegate was obliged to withdraw his resolution owing to lack of support, was not commented on in the Soviet press. IZVESTIYA, however, published its report of the session under the heading "No compromises with the colonizers"; and it was noted that the resolution moved by "NATO members headed by the USA", which "attempted to whitewash the dirty adventure of their Belgian ally and also to shield the improper role of the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjoeld" found no support among the neutral countries' delegations.

The Conference of African States in Leopoldville

The tone of Soviet comment on the conference of independent African States in Leopoldville (25th-31st August) was set by Khrushchev's message to the conference (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26.8.60). Khrushchev said in his message that "the imperialist aggression against the Congo Republic is in essence an aggression against all African States", and that "the Soviet Government is convinced that the African States and their many friends have the forces and the possibilities decisively to repel the intrigues of the colonizers". He expressed the sympathy and support of the Soviet people for the African peoples, and his confidence that "this conference will take effective decisions with the aim of frustrating the criminal plans of the imperialist conspiracy against the independent Congo Republic".

In a report on the conference Khokhlov (IZVESTIYA 30.8.60) noted that the Guinean representative had recalled Sekou Toure's affirmation that Guinea was ready to give the Congo any aid, "including military aid". However, the other delegates' speeches were not reported in any detail, and the decisions of the conference were only partially reported. Orestov (PRAVDA 1.9.60) noted that one resolution had expressed the hope that co-operation between the Congo and the UN would develop normally and that the incidents which had taken place would not be repeated; he did not say, however, that the conference had unanimously agreed to send a message of appreciation to Dr. Bunche for his services, and had urged that African assistance to the Congo should be "harmonized" with UN aid. Orestov concluded that the conference had shown how much sympathy the Congolese people's just cause of independence enjoyed throughout Africa. Khokhlov (IZVESTIYA 1.9.60) called the conference "an African Bandung" and said that it was "a symbol of relentless struggle with the outworn colonial system of oppression".

The Events of 5th-20th September

The following is a chronological account of Soviet reports and comment on Congo developments following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba on 5th September.

7.9.60 Soviet newspapers published the first reports of the conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba. The fact that Kasavubu had announced his dismissal of Lumumba was only reported in so many words; Lumumba's statement affirming the illegality of this action were reported at length. The UN command's action in closing Leopoldville radio station was reported. No comments were made, but IZVESTIYA's dispatch was headed "Kasavubu a Traitor".

8.9.60 PRAVDA reported indications of Western support for Kasavubu: his broadcast from Brazzaville radio, it said (quoting HUMANITE), showed that "the French colonialists are openly participating in the plot to strangle the new independent State"; the "puppet" Tshombe had declared his support for Kasavubu; and the US press had frankly expressed its satisfaction at UN intervention in the Congo's affairs. On the other hand, the official Ghana press had called Kasavubu a "henchman of the imperialists".

In IZVESTIYA K. Smirnov said that "the imperialists headed by the USA and acting under cover of the UN flag" were the force behind the "quisling" Kasavubu; it was no accident that, just when Kasavubu was claiming to have dismissed Lumumba, the UN forces refused to allow Lumumba into the radio station. The UN command was putting US imperialist policy into practice - the policy of "filling the vacuum" in the Congo. In effect, Belgian occupation and aggression had only been exchanged for occupation and aggression by the UN forces. "The idea of internationalization of aggression against the Congolese people belongs without a doubt to the US monopolies"; they considered themselves the rightful heirs of the Belgian and other colonial empires. Smirnov concluded with an appeal for African solidarity with the Congolese people, defending their independence against the colonialists.

9.9.60 In a report from Accra PRAVDA's correspondent Orestov said that "the attempt of the imperialists with the aid of their henchmen to overthrow the Congo Government has been unmasked before the whole world". The Congolese parliament's repudiation of Kasavubu's illegal measures had decisively defeated the "putsch". "When he struck his blow, Kasavubu turned for aid, before everything else, to the UN. This shows that already previously an agreement had been reached between the Congolese putschists and those UN figures who blindly carry out the orders of imperialist reaction."

IZVESTIYA reported Lumumba's accusations against the UN forces of acting as if the Congo belonged to them and trying to create anarchy so as to have an excuse to take over the country; "we do not want their money - let them go away and leave us in peace." IZVESTIYA also published an article by the Tass observer P. Yegorov alleging that the UN representatives made no secret of their preference for Kasavubu, and condemning the UN's action in closing airfields and Leopoldville radio.

10.9.60 PRAVDA published a Soviet Government statement which was principally directed against UN activities in the Congo. It accused the UN command of "collusion" with "the Belgian colonialists and their NATO allies, and in the first place the USA", in an "attempt to strangle the freedom of the Congolese people". It said that the closing of Leopoldville radio and of the Congo airfields were evidence of this. The UN command, supported by the NATO countries and above all the USA, was "openly attempting to discredit the legitimate Government of the Congo Republic with Premier Lumumba at its head", and was "following a policy of encouraging secessionist, anti-popular elements who, to curry favour with the colonialists, are ready to sacrifice the independence of the country and sell off its territory". An insidious attempt was being made to suppress the young Congo Republic by the hands of African soldiers from Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia and Ghana - an attempt to establish over the Congo "a collective colonialism of the NATO countries, with the blue flag of the UN as cover". The States which had sent their forces to defend the Congo's independence, in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, must see that they were used for this purpose; "if the UN command refuses to comply with these resolutions, they must be carried out over the head of this command." As regards the UN Secretary-General himself, he had "proved to be precisely that component of the UN apparatus which was most openly working in favour of the colonialists, thus compromising the UN in the eyes of the peoples". The Security Council must be convened forthwith to take measures to terminate this interference in the Congo's internal affairs. The Soviet statement concluded:

> "For this purpose in the first place it is essential to evacuate the armed forces at the disposal of the UN command from all aerodromes they are occupying at present. National radio stations must be again placed at the complete and unlimited disposal of the Congo Government. The command which is using the troops, dispatched to the Congo in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council, for purposes for which they were not intended must be dismissed. The legitimate Government of the Congo Republic must be allowed to exercise its sovereign rights and authority over the entire territory of the Congo without any interference or hindrance from the UN representatives. The Soviet Government will press for all this at the meeting of the Security Council, and it expects that its efforts will be supported by all States which cherish the cause of national independence and security of the peoples, which do not want the name of the UN to be stained by disgraceful complicity with the colonialists. If, however, the Security Council for some reason is unable to discharge its duty, the States which respect the earlier resolutions on assistance to the Congo at this hour of trial of the Congolese people must render every support to the legitimate Government of the Congo Republic."

11.9.60 PRAVDA, in its report of the Security Council session, said that Hammarskjoeld had "clearly shown what his policy of 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of this young African State amounts to"; he had tried to cast doubt on the legality of Lumumba's dismissal of the "traitor" Kasavubu, had sought to justify UN action in preventing the Congo Government from using the radio station and airfields, and had placed on the same level Belgian military aid for Tshombe and the material aid given by the peace-loving states to the lawful Government of the Congo.

12.9.60 PRAVDA (article by D. Kraminov) "Every day yields new proof of the fact that Belgium's NATO allies - the USA, Britain and France - are using UN troops in the Congo to fight its legitimate Government ... With the help of Hammarskjoeld the NATO countries have unleashed a civil war in the Congo. By setting one tribe against the other they have created an atmosphere which deprives the legitimate Government in Leopoldville of the possibility of administering the provinces. The colonizers intentionally create civil dissensions and then present them to the whole world as proof of the inability of African peoples to administer themselves. The colonizers have also succeeded in worsening relations between young African States which, with such insistence, have been striving for unity of action in the international arena. By using the troops of African countries which have come to the Congo under the UN flag against the Congolese people, the colonizers are trying to split the family of African peoples ... Hammarskjoeld is trying to use the blue flag of the UN to cover up a treacherous plot against the young African Republic."

14.9.60 PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA reported, without comment, Lumumba's appeal to Afro-Asian UN members for aircraft and arms, and his statement that if he was refused such aid his Government would be "compelled to seek this aid elsewhere".

In an article in PRAVDA V. Vasil'yev said that the attempt to arrest Lumumba was an example of "the insolent intrigues of imperialist forces, using the UN flag for their dirty ends". Nkrumah, he said, had informed Hammarskjoeld that, if Lumumba was not allowed to use his own radio, Ghana would withdraw her forces from UN command and place them at Lumumba's full disposal; and Guinea and the UAR had already withdrawn their forces from UN command. "This decisive protest of the African States produced a sobering effect on the accomplices of the colonizers." The airfields had been reopened, and Congo forces had assumed control of the radio station. "Thus failed ingloriously one more adventure of the imperialists and their agents against the lawful Government of the Congo." But the colonizers were not likely to abandon their efforts; the African peoples must unite their forces in defence of the young Congo Republic.

15.9.60 IZVESTIYA published a dispatch from its correspondent Khokhlov in Leopoldville. The lawful Congo Government, said Khokhlov, was like a man bound hand and foot; it has no longer any links with the provinces, had no means of maintaining order, and the life of the country was again paralyzed - not this time as a result of Belgian aggression, but as a result of the activities of the UN command, acting under US inspiration. The UN command had come out on the side of the Kasavubu group. A UN spokesman had given the news of an "armistice" between the forces of the Government and those of Tshombe and Kalondji. "This invention had only one aim - to confuse the people and to create disunity and uncertainty in the ranks of the Congolese patriots." It was significant that the airports were open for almost daily flights of transport aircraft from the USA and Canada. The UN command had expressed readiness to guarantee the security of Tshombe and Kalondji, who were invited to Leopoldville for talks with Kasavubu and Ileo. The UN forces were disarming some Congolese soldiers, and gendarmerie units to support Kasavubu were being recruited from their number. "Impostors" were exploiting the fact that Lumumba's Government could no longer pay the soldiers, and were buying them with "money received from New York and Brussels banks". But Gen. Lundula had declared, in an interview with the correspondent, that the Congolese army was loyal to Lumumba. Khokhlov concluded: "To avert the threat of fratricidal war now hanging over the Congo is only possible by the immediate withdrawal from the country of the UN units sent by the Western States which are here fulfilling the role of a Trojan horse of NATO."

16.9.60 Soviet newspapers published the news of Mobutu's coup, but also at the same time the report that he had been arrested. IZVESTIYA published a dispatch from Khokhlov, with an account of Mobutu's press conference in the Hotel Regina, where, he said, "the callow little Napoleon showed his cards". Khokhlov noted that, after announcing his introduction of a military regime in the Congo, Mobutu resorted to "dirty abuse and slander against the countries of the socialist camp, and against the Soviet Union"; as evidence of Soviet "interference" he had brandished the Soviet booklet "Hands Off the Congo" - which, said Khokhlov, had been "read with immense interest by the population of the Republic". Mobutu described Soviet specialists in the Congo as "officers in disguise", and said he had demanded the closing of the Soviet and Czechoslovak Embassies within 48 hours and the departure of their personnel from the Congo. Khokhlov noted that Belgian bystanders loudly applauded Mobutu's words, and went on:

> "So it happened that an irresponsible character, understanding simply nothing about military matters or politics, became king for a day in the Congo Republic. Mobutu had been bought by Belgium. About two years ago Belgian Catholics sent him from Leopoldville to study in Brussels University. Here they

make no secret of the fact that the student from the Congo did not gnaw at the rock of science at all in the Belgian capital but was in the service of the metropolitan intelligence organisation. It was only with the assistance of his masters that Mobutu, a second-year student in the sociological faculty, who had never held a rifle in his hands, became Chief of Staff of the Congolese army. It has also become known that Mobutu received 7,000,000 francs from Kasavubu allegedly to finance the army immediately before the putsch."

PRAVDA gave an account of Lumumba's statement denouncing Mobutu as an agent of the imperialists, and announcing that he had been arrested; power was in Lumumba's hands, said the newspaper, but the colonizers would not shrink from any crime to gain control of the country.

17.9.60 Under the heading "The conspiracy is spreading" IZVESTIYA published an account of events in the Congo by K. Smirnov, based on Western news agency reports. Smirnov explained that "on 15th September the dispatch of messages by our special correspondent in Leopoldville was interrupted". He noted that, according to reports, Mobutu was not in fact under arrest as was stated earlier. However, Smirnov observed that, according to other reports, considerable numbers of the Congolese troops still supported Lumumba, and units of the central army were invading Katanga.

PRAVDA published the text of the Soviet draft resolution in the Security Council, which among other things "charges the Secretary-General to remove the present command of the UN armed forces, whose actions constitute a gross violation of the Security Council resolutions on the Congo".

(Subsequent Soviet reports made no mention of the Ceylonese-Tunisian compromise resolution, against which the Soviet representative used the veto.)

19.9.60 PRAVDA published a report of the emergency UN General Assembly session, under the heading "The USA's dirty game in the Congo". The session, it said, was "unlawfully and hastily convened under US pressure ... after the US delegation had failed to drag through the Security Council a resolution on the Congo favourable to the Western powers". The aim of the Americans was "to prevent the world from getting to know the true situation in the Congo and giving its approval to a resolution which would finally tie their (the Americans') hands in the execution of their colonialist policy in the Congo". The Soviet delegate Zorin had exposed the real motives of the USA in calling for the emergency session and refusing to wait for the opening of the fifteenth session of the General

Assembly, on whose agenda at the instance of the Soviet Government was included the question of "the threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo Republic". PRAVDA went on to give a lengthy account of Zorin's speech attacking Hammarskjoeld.

PRAVDA also published the Soviet Government statement announcing the "temporary recall" of the Soviet Embassy staff from the Congo. The statement said that the normal functioning of the Embassy had become impossible, since its immunity and the security of its staff had become endangered. "Intrigues of the colonizers and their agents, and also the unconcealed interference of the UN command in the Congo's internal affairs" had led to a situation in which the country's legitimate Government and parliament had been eliminated. "The colonizers have by means of fraud and corruption succeeded in establishing a puppet regime in power in the Congo that is obedient to aliens. A situation has resulted in Leopoldville where the colonizers, exploiting their stooges and other political rogues, resort to dirty provocations in order to harm the good relations established between the Soviet Union and the Congo Republic." The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the young Republic remained unchangeably friendly, and the Soviet Union would continue to give all aid and support to the Congolese people in their fight for independence against the colonizers.

21.9.60 IZVESTIYA published its report of the result of the special General Assembly session under the heading "Decision for the Congolese people". It said that paragraph 6 of the operative part of the Assembly resolution, calling on all States to refrain from direct or indirect military aid to the Congo Republic, had been separately voted on and passed unanimously. (No mention was made of the abstention of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc States from voting on the resolution.) It was noted that the Soviet delegate Zorin had said that the resolution "only gives the direction to be followed by the UN, and the solution of all the Congo problems will depend on the Congolese people" - the Assembly could discuss the Congo question again at its new session.

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